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NOTES AND COMMENTS
time the delinquency is established, the individual's wage record with
the Social Security Board will be corrected without prejudice to the
employee and the Federal Old-Age and Surivivors Insurance Trust
Fund will stand the loss of the amount of the unpaid tax.
Another problem frequently arises when the employer's report
does not completely identify the wage earner.35 The field offices of
the Board first attempt to trace these items by contacting the em-
ployers who reported them. Unlocated amounts are recorded under
the employers' names in a suspense ledger maintained by the Board.
If in the future the employee claims an amount from an employer
this claim may be located in the suspense ledger, so that the appli-
cant will receive the benefits on the basis of wages earned, although
they were not credited to his individual account originally.
Strict limitation is placed on the privilege of challenging the ac-
curacy of the wage records of the Board. The amended Act provides
that an individual may request a hearing to prove such error up to
the end of the fourth calendar year after the wages were paid or
were alleged to have been paid. After that four year period, the
records of the Board are conclusive; but the Board may, on its own
initiative, at any time revise such records to conform to tax returns
filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.38 Thus, even after
the four year period has passed, if it is disclosed that an employer
failed to pay over an employee's tax and an additional assessment
is made against the employer, the amount of previously unreported
wages can be recorded on the individual's wages earned record if
the Board chooses.
J. Lloyd Fitzpatrick
PROOF OF BENEFICIAL INTEREST
The insured worker, his wife, children, or parents may be en-
titled to Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance benefits. Thus the prob-
lems of age, dependency, common law marriages, illegitimacy, and
adoption merit discussion. Proof of age is discussed in the light
of the general rules of evidence. Dependency in this situation is
primarily a statutory matter. Status or the right to inherit is gov-
erned by the law of the state of the insured worker's domicile.
PROOF OF AGE
One of the eligibility qualifications for primary old-age insur-
ance benefits is that the claimant attain the age of sixty-five.1 The
same age requirement is found in other provisions for benefits. 2
3 5 ATT'Y. GEN. COMMITTEE ON ADIMIINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, SOCIAL SE-
CURITY BOARD (Monograph No. 16, 1940) 7.
36 53 STAT. 1369 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §405 (Supp. 1940).
1 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1939 Amendment) §202(a), 53 STAT. 1363 (1939),
42 U.S.C.A. §402 (Supp. 1940).
2Wife's Insurance Benefits, §202(b), id. at 1364, 42 U.S.C.A. §402(b)
(Supp. 1940); Parents Insurance Benefits, §202(f), id. at 1366,
42 U.S.C.A. §402(f) (Supp. 1940); Widow's Insurance Benefits,
§202(d), id. at 1365, 42 U.S.C.A. §402(d) (Supp. 1940).
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Proof of the age of any other individual whose age is relevant to
the determination of a claim may also be required.3 Thus the proof
of age presents a common evidentiary problem in connection with
benefit claims.
The problem is essentially different from one arising in an
action at law. There is no legal controversy in the usual sense and
no adverse party. The problem is only to supply sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the Board that the claim is meritorious. A legal
controversy can arise only on appeal by the claimant after the Board
has denied a claim.4 Thus, because of the Board's liberality in ad-
mitting evidence, it seems improbable that many will contest the
Board's rulings on the admission of evidence.
The regulations of the Social Security Board require that evi-
dence in support of an application shall be filed with an agency of
the Board.5 They classify evidence into two types, preferred and
secondary. Preferred proof includes a copy of either a public record
of birth or a church record of infant baptism, or in lieu thereof,
a statement as to the date of birth shown by such record, duly cer-
tified by the custodian of such record.6
In general, these rules are in harmony with the law of evidence
concerning the use of public records. The general rule is that a
public record of births, properly kept "as required by law" is com-
petent evidence of facts stated therein.7 The Board, however, does
not require that the record be made at or shortly after the date of
birth, but will assume that there has been compliance with the stan-
sA condition to eligibility for Wife's Insurance Benefits is that claim-
ant be wife of an individual entitled to primary insurance bene-
fits. §202(b), id. at 1364, 42 U.S.C.A. §402(b) (Supp. 1940).
Where one is claiming widow's current insurance benefits or a
lump-sum death payment, and it appears that the claimant may
become entitled to a monthly benefit within one year of the date
of filing, the practice of the Board is to request proof of age of
the claimant. An applicant may be required to furnish proof
of age of a deceased wage earner if such is needed to determine
his insured status or the amount of his average monthly wage.
Soc. See. Bd., Claims Manual (1940), §905. It is also necessary
to prove age under §202(c), where a claimant for child's insur-
ance benefits is required to be under the age of 18. 53 STAT.
1364, 42 U.S.C.A. §402(c) (Supp. 1940).
4The Board itself being the adjudicating body, it cannot appeal from
its own decision. See §205 of the Amended Act; id. at 1368, 42
U.S.C.A. §405 (Supp. 1940).
For claims adjudication procedure generally, see Ladimer, Hearing
and Review of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Claims and Wage
Record Cases by the Social Security Board (1940) 9 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 58.
5 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.702.
O Id. §403.702 (b).
7 See generally 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (3d ed. 1940) §§1642-1646. Sum-
ner v. Sebec, 3 Me. 223 (1824); State v. Adbul Hamid Suleiman,
100 N.J.L. 401, 126 Atl. 425 (1924); Creer v. Active Automobile
Exchange, 99 Conn. 266, 121 Atl. 888 (1923); State v. Dierlamm,
189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938); State v. Shelby, 333 Mo. 610,
62 S.W. (2d) 721 (1933); of. Jacobi v. Order of Germania, 26
N.Y.S. 318 (1893).
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dards prescribed by the state or community for establishing authen-
ticity of records.8 This is more liberal than the rule at law, where
the record is usually only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein, and the court may look to the promptness and manner of
making the entry to determine credibility.9 In view of the Board's
discretion in weighing evidence, it probably would require additional
evidence where the circumstances surrounding the making of an en-
try cast doubt on its authenticity.
Again, the regulations, insofar as they admit a certified state-
ment of the custodian of the records as to the date of birth shown
therein, constitute a deviation from the general law of evidence. And
the Board has gone farther and admitted certificates as to the con-
tents of records by public officers ather than the custodian.10 An
application of the best evidence rule would require that a copy of
the record be submitted unless it were shown to be unavailable."
And in any event, in the absence of peculiar extenuating circum-
stances, only the statement of the regular custodian of the records
would be admissable to show their contents. 12
In the future it is probable that public records of births will
become the usual means of proving age. Most states have statutes
requiring the keeping of such records and many of the statutes
specifically state that they shall be admissable in evidence.1 3 How-
ever, because of the incompleteness of such records as of sixty-five
years ago, they are as yet not available in a great many cases.
In the use of baptismal records to prove age, the Board appar-
ently will follow the general rules of evidence that the record is
admissable only to prove the facts with which the record was pri-
marily concerned, ie. the fact or date of baptism.14 In case the
baptismal record shows on its face, or it is proved by other evidence
that it is a reliable record of age then, of course, it will be accepted
for that purpose.
8. Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §906.
02 TONES, EvmF N.c (4th ed. 1938) §509; Niles v. Sprague, 13 Iowa
198 (1862); Sams v. State, 195 Ind. 497, 145 N.E. 773 (1924); cf.
Manship v. People, 99 Colo. 1, 58 P.(2d) 1215 (1936); Hickey v.
Morrisey, 50 Atl. 183 (N.J.Eq., 1901).
The Board has accepted a probate court judgment, containing ajudicial finding as to the date of birth of a claimant, and cor-
recting the county's record of births in that respect, as satis-
factory proof of age. Opinion of Counsel, Sac. Sec. Bd., Nov. 9,
1937.
10 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §906.
114 WIGBIORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1245; 2 JONES, EVIDENCE (4th ed.
1938) §543.
12 Watkins Medical Co. v. Martin, 132 Ark. 108, 200 S.W. 283 (1917);
Sykes v. Beck, 12 N. Dak. 242, 96 N.W. 844 (1903); Fisher v.
Betts, 12 N. D. 197, 96 N.W. 132 (1903).
23 See note 6 supra; 5 wiG mOR, EVIDENE (3d ed. 1940) §569.
14 Blackburn v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 175 (U.S. 1886); State v. Laroica,
157 La. 50, 101 So. 868 (1924); Houlton v. Manteuffel, 51 Minn.
185, 53 N.W. 541 (1892). Note (1925) 36 A.L.R. 689.
15 Ford v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. 655, 200 S.W. 841 (1918); Kennedy v.
Doyle, 10 Allen 161 (Mass. 1865).
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Where one of the preferred types of proof is submitted, no ad-
ditional evidence will ordinarily be required. However, where no
preferred proof is available, secondary evidence must be submitted.
But before secondary evidence will be considered, the reasons for
the failure of preferred proof must be stated, and mere difficulty
or expense in securing such proof is no excuse. Acceptable reasons
for not submitting preferred proof include: that no records were
maintained at the time of birth; that the records have been destroyed
by fire, flood, etc.; that the claimant does not know where he was
born; etc. The sufficiency of the reasons will depend on the facts
in each particular case.' 5
Secondary evidence, as defined in the regulations, includes (1)
a statement of the physician or midwife who attended at the time
of birth, (2) a certification, upon the approved form, that there
exists a Bible or other family record showing the age of the indi-
vidual in question, as stated on such form, or (3) other evidence
of probative value.' 6
The first type of evidence enumerated in the regulations can
be classed in the law of evidence as testimony of persons having
personal knowledge of the matter under investigation. Such evidence
is clearly admissable at law and deserves little comment here.'7 It
is curious to note, however, that at law such evidence is generally
given preference over what the board classifies as preferred proof.'8
The Board will accept an affidavit of any person having per-
sonal knowledge of the age of the person in question.' 9 Such affidavit,
to be acceptable must show sufficient basis for the affiant's knowl-
edge.20 If the affiant is a close relative of the individual whose
age is in question, only one affidavit is required, otherwise two affi-
davits are necessary. 21
A certification of the contents of a family Bible, or other family
records, has generally been held admissable at law under the excep-
tion to the hearsay rule concerning matters of family tradition.22
However, unlike the general rule at law, the Board has not mentioned
any requirement that the original author of the declaration be un-
available. 25 The practice of the Board has been to require a copy,
:16 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.702(b); Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual
(1940) §908.
17 Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.702 (b).
IsHerman v. State, 73 Wis. 248, 41 N.W. 171 (1888); State v. Berry,
192 Iowa 191, 182 N.W. 781 (1921).
19 4 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1336.
20 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §909 (m).
21 See note 20 supra. Sufficient basis for knowledge would be that
affiant is a very close relative; that he personally viewed Bible,
family, or other birth records not now obtainable; that he per-
sonally heard the individual's parents state the date of birth;
that he attended celebrations of the individual's birthday, giving
the dates of those celebrations and the individual's ages on such
dates; that he knew individual to be so much older or younger
than himself; etc.
22 See note 20 supra.
23 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1495.
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and preferably a photostatic copy of the record.24  In any event thu
authenticity of the record must be established on independent evi-
dence.2 5
Excerpts from church or hospital records which show the date
of birth may be submitted. It is necessary, however, that the person
having custody of the records certify that such excerpts are true
copies from original records in his custody. Unless the person hav-
ing custody of such records makes certification on the organization's
letterhead or over the organization's seal or his own seal of office,
or otherwise adequately indentifies the organization and his own
status as custodian of such records, his certification must be under
oath.2 6
Passports and naturalization or immigration records are accept-
able in those cases where they are available. A certification of the
contents of such records usually is sufficient because of the re-
quirement of proof of age when the original record was made. 27
Other documents may be submitted as secondary evidence. Thus
a certification as to the pertinent facts in insurance policies, excerpts
from school, lodge or other fraternal records, information found in
service records of the armed forces of the United States, excerpts
from employment and labor records, the age of a parent in a child's
birth certificate, information in voting records, poll tax receipts,
marriage records, licenses and certificates, and even records of the
Bureau of Census have been admitted.28
The Board has set general standards to test the relative merit
of secondary evidence. First, the evidence must have been recorded
prior to the passage of the Social Security Act. Then consideration
is given to: the purpose for which the record was established; 29 the
basis for the record; 3° the formality of its creation; 31 the age of
the document; 32 and the custody of the document. 33
24 Id. §1481.
25 Opinion of Counsel Soc. Sec. Bd., Sept. 15, 1937.
2 See note 20 supra; 5 WIGBIORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §1496.
27 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §909 (a).
28 Id. §909(c), (d), (e). The making of copies of such documents is
generally prohibited by law, making necessary in those cases the
use of a certificate as to its contents.
Some countries, before granting permission to emigrate, require
the person to secure certain documents from the church or state
which show his age and other personal history. The Board has
manifested high regard for these documents as evidence. Soc.
Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §905.
2, Id. §909(f)-(1).
30i.e. Whether it would have been to the claimant's advantage to be
older or younger at the time the record was made. Soc. Sec. Bd.,
Claims Manual (1940) §908.31i.e. Whether proof was required and who was required to furnish
the information. Id. §908.
32 i.e. Whether the statement was made under oath; whether corraborat-
ing proof was required; and whether a penalty could be imposed
for a false statement. Id. §908..
33 i.e. Whether the document was made at or near the time of birth. Id.
§908.
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The Board has been liberal in accepting secondary evidence.
Much of this evidence would be excluded in legal proceedings under
the hearsay evidence rule.34 In light of the Board's liberality in
admitting evidence, it is improbable that claimants will secure more
favorable action in a court of law. This is particularly true since
courts will support findings of fact based on substantial evidence,
even though evidence that would be incompetent in court proceeding
has been admitted.85
PROOF OF DEPENDENCY
Dependency is a condition to entitlement to benefits under three
provisions of Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance. For child's benefits
dependence of the claimant upon the wage earner must be shown;
for widow's current insurance benefits, the widow must have in her
care a dependent child of a deceased wage earner; and for parent's
insurance benefit the claimant must have been wholly dependent upon
the wage earner at the time of the wage earner's death.88 In addition
to the other requirements of dependency, a child must be unmarried
and under the age of eighteen. 87 These requirements might be treated
as part of the problem of dependency.8  However, since they consti-
tute matters readily capable of proof,8 9 they will not be dealt with
here.
A claim for child's benefits may be based on wages of either a
living wage earner entitled to primary insurance benefits, or a wage
earner who died fully or currently insured. If the claim is based
on wages of a living wage earner dependency is determined as of
the time of application; if on wages of a deceased wage earner as
of the time of death of such individual.
Actual economic dependency is not necessary under the Act for
dependency of a child. A child is dependent if at the time in ques-
tion the father was living with the child or contributing to his sup-
port. And even on failure of these conditions, the child is dependent
if he was the legitimate or adopted child of the wage earner, and
is not the adopted child of another individual. In the case of a
claim based on wages of a deceased father the additional condition
834 i.e. Whether it was in possession of any one who might have had
reason to alter it. Id. §908.
85 5 WIGMORE, EVIDONCE (3d ed. 1940) §§1361-1363.
36 See generally 1 id. §4(a), (c). Wigmore, Administrative Board Evi-
dence Rules (1922) 17 Ill. L. Rev. 263.
The place where the courts have been most frequently concerned
with this proposition is in connection with appeals from the action
of industrial boards in their administration of the Workmen's
Compensation Laws. See DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION (1936) 227-236; Ross, Rules of Evidence before
Commissions (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263.
87 See 53 STAT. 1363, 1364, 1365 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §402 (c), (e),
(f) (Supp. 1940) ; Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §§403.404, 403.406, 403.407.
88 See IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §40-1403, for definitions of de-
pendants under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act.
89 See Proof of Age, p. 525 supra.
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for dependency is laid down, that the child must not have been liv-
ing with or supported by a stepfather. If the claim is based on
wages of a mother or stepparent, a child is dependent on such per-
son if, at the time in question, the child was not living with its
father or adopting father, and such father was not contributing
to its support.
In administering the above provisions, the Social Security Board
has construed "living with" to mean that the child and parent share
a common roof.40 The child may be away from home periodically,
as when attending school, so long as he makes his home, when not
at school, with the parent. If the child is "living with" the parent
financial contribution to the support of the child is not necessary.
Where the child is not "living with" the parent, the parent must
contribute to his support. "Contributions to support" means contri-
butions that are both substantial and regular. Gifts on special oc-
casions, such as birthdays, unless in amounts sufficient to care for
the child in the interims, are not contributions, nor is any gift for
a purpose other than support. Occasional small donations for lux-
uries not within the means of the child are not contributions. But
any regular contributions which constitute a material factor in the
support of the child create dependency. The facts of each case, how-
ever, will determine the reasonable cost of support.
"Supported by" means furnishing the major part of a child's
support. In determining this, consideration is given to the normal
necessities of the child. A child can be dependent on its father and
also on its mother and stepparents at the same time if the fathez
is neither living with nor contributing to the support of the child,
and the child is legitimate and not adopted by another. However,
if the father is deceased and these same facts exist, but the child
was living with and being supported by a stepfather at the time
of his father's death, the child is dependent only on its mother or
stepparent. And under the "major support" doctrine a child may
be dependent on its mother or stepparent, rather than on a deceased
father, even though at the time of his death such father was con-
tributing to the child's support.
The problem of proof of the necessary facts to establish a child's
dependency is a simple one. The regulations of the Board allow
proof thereof by a verified statement of a person having personal
knowledge of the facts.41 In practice, the Board accepts the mere
statement in the child's application that he is or was living with
his father, without corroboration unless there appears evidence to
the contrary.42
In determining dependency of children, no question of economic
dependency is involved. But for parent's benefit, the parent must
have been at. the time of the covered employee's death wholly de-
pendent upon and supported by him. The Board has ruled that a
40 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §310.
41 Soc. Sec. Bd., Reg. 3, §403.702.
42 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §921.
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parent is "wholly dependent upon and supported by" an individual
if such parent has no other income or means of support other than
that received from the wage earner or has only inconsequential in-
come or means of support.43
In determining A parent's dependency, the Board gives consider-
ation to such matters as: (1) the amount contributed by the wage
earner, (2) the period of such contributions, (3) the amount of other
income received by the parent, (4) the period and source of such
other income, (5) the ratio between the wage-earner's contribution
and the parent's total income, (6) the value and nature of property
owned by the parent at the time of the wage earner's death, (7)
whether the parent lived in the same household as the wage earner,
and (8) whether the parent or the wage earner was head of that
household. 44 Income of the parent includes cash or kind from any
source. Public assistance is income, but does not disqualify the
recipient.
In practice, the Board does not require that a parent be in ab-
solute pauper circumstances in order to be eligible. The parent is
allowed to have resources not in excess of $1,000, computed on a
forced sale basis, besides a home of a reasonable value, customary
clothing, and household goods. This allowance is per parent, and if
both parents of a wage earner are claiming, the same allowance
is granted each, except as to the home and household goods if they
were living together. A home valued at $3,000 does not disqualify
a claim.
A parent is considered "supported by" a wage earner if, over
a period of time sufficient to indicate support, he has contributed
seventy-five per cent of the parent's income. The year preceding
the wage-earner's death is normally used as the period of measure-
ment. Contributions equaling less than 75% of the parent's income
is considered support, if the facts indicate that intent and the failure
to contribute more was due to unemployment or illness of the wage
earner. Where the parent and the wage earner were living together
in the same household, board and room is valued at $15 per month,
and if it was furnished by the parent to the wage earner, that amount
is deducted from the wage earner's contributions. But if board and
room is furnished by a wage earner to the parent, the parent is
deemed dependent upon and supported by such person, provided the
parent did not receive other income amounting to $15 or more per
month and meets the general property qualifications.
These standards, however, are only guides in the determination
of a case. Each case rests on its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances. Proof of the facts necessary to show dependency of a par-
ent must be made within two years of the wage earner's death. A
verified statement by the claimant is normally sufficient to establish
a claim.
43 Soc. See. kBd., Reg. 3, §403.407.
44 Soc. Sec. Bd., Claims Manual (1940) §606.
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PROOF OF STATUS
Under the Social Security Act not only the insured worker,
but also his wife, children, and parents may be entitled to the bene-
fits provided in the Act.45 While other qualifications must exist be-
fore either the wife, child or parent is entitled to these benefits, 46
the claimant must establish his status or right to inherit as spouse,
child or parent. The existence of such status or right of inheritance
is determined by the law of the state of domicil of the insured work-
er. 47 Section 209(m) of the Act provides that applicants who ac-
cording to such law would have the same status relative to taking
intestate personal property as a wife, widow, child, or parent shall
have similar status for claims under the Act.
Marriage. Where the applicant and the insured worker have
been united in a valid ceremonial marriage the problem of proof
is negligible. Only when the proof of relationship is founded on
a common law marriage is the problem complicated. The validity
of the marriage will depend on the law of the state of domicil of
the insured worker.
Common law marriages per verba de futuro cum copula are gen-
erally invalid,48 but more than half of the states recognize per verba
de praesenti marriages.49 Where common law marriages are valid,
proof of their existence may be established by proof of the contract
or of facts from which a contract may be implied. But seldom if
ever is there proof of a contract directly. Its existence usually is
established by evidence that the parties held themselves out as hus-
band and wife and were so considered in the community.
As the application for benefits is usually not contested, and
ceremonial marriages may be proved by indirect evidence, it is alto-
gether possible, even in states not recognizing common law marriage
that applicants asserting married status may receive benefits upon
proof of marriage, although the fact of marriage would not be recog-
nized.50 In case of a contest disclosing the common law character
of the marriage the Board would, of course, be bound by the law
of the state and the benefit would be denied.
In Indiana common law marriages are valid.5 ' Aided by the
presumption of the validity of marriage and the presumption against
45 See 53 STAT. 1363 (1939), 42 U. S. C. A. §402 (Supp. 1940).
46 Ibid.
47 See id. at 1378, 42 U. S. C. A. §409 (in) (Supp. 1940).
48 Lynch, Social Security Encounters Common Law Marriage in North
Carolina (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 255, 257-258.
4 9 MAy, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS IN THE U. S. (1929) 11-12
00 Lynch, supra note 48, at 273. For additional articles on common-
law marriage and the Social Security Act see Billig and Lynch,
Common-Law Marriage in Minnesota: A Problem in Social Secur-
ity (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 177; Moynahan, Common-Law Mar-
riage in Ohio (1938) 5 Ohio St. L. J. 26, 175.51 Argiroff v. Argiroff, 215 Ind. 297, 19 N. E. (2d) 560 (1939), 14
Ind. L. J. 539.
534 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the illegitimacy of children, 5 2 the Indiana court has held "that such
marriages will be sustained unless the statute expressly declares them
void."5 3 Once the common-law marriage is consummated, the effect
is the same as a statutory and ceremonial marriage.54
The Indiana courts have repeatedly refused to state the quantum
of evidence necessary to establish a common-law marriage.5  It
has been said that "To raise the presumption of marriage by such
means, the evidence must be clear and convincing, and where there
is legal evidence in the record to negative the legal presumption
in favor of the marriage and from which a contrary presumption
may arise, all former evidence falls or is neutralized. . ."5 The
following conclusions, however, are supported by the Indiana cases
involving common-law marriage: There is a presumption of a valid
marriage.5 7 A contract of marriage is essential to create a common-
law marriage. 58 This contract may be implied or proved by circum-
stantial evidence. 5 9 Apparently the contract must be accompanied
by cohabitation. 60  Cohabitation is evidence from which the pre-
sumption may be indulged that a contract was entered into,61 but
-52 See note 54 infra. Note that use of such presumptions may render
subsequent statutory marriage void and bastardize the issue of
such later marriage.
53 Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 135 (1885).
54 Argiroff v. Argiroff, 215 Ind. 297, 19 N. E. (2d) 560 (1939), 14
nd. L. J. 539; Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95
(1935); Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman, 91 Ind. App. 363, 171
N. E. 241 (1929) ; Hummel v. State, 73 Ind. App. 12, 126 N. E. 444
(1920).
55 Argiroff v. Argiroff, 215 Ind. 297, 19 N. E. (2d) 560 (1939), 14
Ind. L. J. 539; Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95
(1935); Meehan v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E.
265 (1919); Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1885).
56 Meehan v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 344, 117 N. E. 265
(1919).
57 Langdon v. Langdon, 204 Ind. 321, 183 N. E. 400 (1932); Castor
v. Davis, 120 Ind. 231, 22 N. E. 110 (1889). "The law presumes
morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage;
legitimacy, and not bastardy." Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1885),
88 Ind. 494 (1883). This presumption is also repeatedly stated
in cases involving statutory marriage.
58 Young v. General Baking Co., 104 Ind. App. 658, 2 N. E. (2d) 1016
(1938); Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman, 91 Ind. App. 363, 171
N. E. 241 (1929); Meehan v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342,
117 N. E. 265 (1919); Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85
N. E. 365 (1909).
55 See cases cited note 58 supra. Note dictum in Meehan case, 65
Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 265 (1919), apparently to the effect that
if the contract be in writing, or proved by witnesses present when
made, proof of cohabitation is unnecessary.
60Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman, 91 Ind. App. 363, 171 N. E.
241 (1929); Meehan v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App., 117 N.
E. 265 (1919); Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E.
365 (1909). In addition to direct statements to this effect, evi-
dence of cohabitation is present in every case.
61 Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95 (1935); Meehan
v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 265 (1919);
Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365 (1909).
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cohabitation cannot of itself constitute marriage.62 Cohabitation il-
licit in its origin is presumed to remain illicit.63 This presumption
may be overcome, however, and a valid common-law marriage estab-
lished though the relationship was meretricious in its beginning.6 4
In the application of this presumption the court is apparently very
strict; and the evidence to overcome the presumption must not only
be very strong but must establish the fact that the marriage contract
was entered into not merely after the cohabitation ceased to be mere-
tricious, but after both parties knew (1) that the cohabitation was
illicit in origin and (2) that it was no longer illicit.6 While it is
not stated that reputation as husband and wife is essential to con-
stitute a valid common-law marriage, evidence of such reputation
is always admissible and is usually present.66 A statutory cere-
monial marriage void for non-compliance -with the statutes may be
valid as a common-law marriage.r.
Common law marriages being valid in Indiana the ability of
applicants to qualify for benefit payments is not hampered by In-
diana marriage laws or judicial decisions.
02 Young v. General Baking Co., 104 Ind. App. 658, 2 N. E. (2d) 1016
(1938); Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95 (1935);
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 95 Ind. App. 345, 182 N. E. 273 (1932);
Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman, 91 Ind. App. 363, 171 N. E.
241 (1929); Mayes v. Mayes, 84 Ind. App. 90, 147 N. E. 630
(1925); Siems v. Kirk, 81 Ind. App. 515, 144 N. E. 146 (1924);
Meehan v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 265
(1919); Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365 (1909).
03 Young v. General Baking Co., 104 Ind. App. 658, 2 N. E. (2d) 1016
(1938); Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95 (1935);
Mayes v. Mayes, 84 Ind. App. 90, 147 N. E. 630 (1925); Meehan
v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E. 265 (1919);
Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365 (1909).64 See Young v. General Baking Co., 104 Ind. App. 658, 2 N. E. (2d)
1016 (1938); Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95
(1935); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 95 Ind. App. 345, 182 N. E. 273
(1932); Meehan v. Edward Valve Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N.
E. 265 (1919); Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E.
365 (1909).
65 Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365 (1909). But cf.
Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1885).66 In several early cases it was said that cohabitation and reputation
are sufficient evidence of marriage, whether common law or
statutory. Bowers, Adm'r v. Van Winkle, 41 Ind. 432 (1872);
Hossaman v. Hossaman, 4 Ind. 648 (1853) (creates rebuttable pre-
sumption); Trimble v. Trimble, 2 Ind. 76 (1850); Fleming v.
Fleming, 8 Blackf. 234 (Ind. 1846). An instruction to that effect
was held bad in Lawrence v. Lawrence, 95 Ind. App. 345, 182 N.
E. 273 (1932). See Harter v. Addison, Adm'x, 80 Ind. App. 204,
138 N. E. 265 (1923).67 Langdon v. Langdon, 204 Ind. 321, 183 N. E. 400 (1932). IND. STAT.
ANN. (Burns, 1933) §44-302 provides: "No marriage shall be void
or voidable for the want of a license or other formality required
by law if either of the parties thereto believed it to be a legal
marriage at the time." As no case has upheld a common-law
marriage under this statute, it apparently does not alter the
common-law marriage, although it is indexed thereunder in
Burns. In Castor v. McDole, 80 Ind. App. 556, 562, 148 N. E. 643
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Illegitimacy. The common law regarded the illegitimate as fi-
luis nullius or filius populi, the child of nobody. "He cannot be heir
to anyone, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being
nullius filius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and as he has no an-
cestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived." 68  Hence
any right of the illegitimate to inherit, or to inherit from an illegiti-
mate, must be purely statutory. In Indiana these rights are gov-
erned by four statutes. 69
The first of these statutes70 confers upon an illegitimate child
the right to inherit from its mother the same as a legitimate child.71
It substitutes the illegitimate child for the mother, and entitles him
to such property as the mother would have taken had she survived
the decedent72  However, the children of a deceased illegitimate
child do not inherit in the place of the illegitimate child.7.
The second statute entitled the illegitimate child to inherit from
the father "in the same manner and to the same extent as if . . .
legitimate," if the father dies intestate,7 4 leaving, at his death, no
surviving legitimate children or descendants of such children,75 and
if he has acknowledged such child during his lifetime as his own.
7 6
(1923) the court said that the purpose of the statute "was not
to change or affect the law as to what was necessary to con-
stitute a common-law marriage, or to provide a rule of evidence
as to what was or was not necessary to be proved to establish a
common-law marriage." The other formality mentioned in the
statute refers to statutory marriage requirements.
681 BL. co m. 459. Accord, L. T. Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddel, 49 Ind.
App. 40, 94 N. E. 411 (1911); Doe dem Crawle v. Bates, 6 Blackf.
533 (Ind. 1848).
69 There are additional statutes provided that certain children, e.g.
issue of statutory marriage void for non-compliance, are legitimate.
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §§44-106-110. This discussion is
limited to the right of the bastard to inherit, to inherit from a
bastard, and to legitimation of the illegitimate. (Note also that a
child begotten before marriage but born afterwards is legitimate.
Doyle v. State, 61 Ind. 3211 (1878).
7 0 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §6-2308. Similar statutes exist in
49 American jurisdictions. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW
(1936) 190.7 1 Jackson v. Hocke, 171 Ind. 371, 84 N. E. 830 (1908).
72 Parks v. Kimes, 100 Ind. 148 (1884).
73 Truelove v. Truelove, 172 Ind. 441, 86 N. E. 1018 (1909).
74Where a devise lapsed because of the death of the devisee prior to
that of the testator, the testator died "intestate" as to such
property under §6-2309, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933). Edwards,
Adm'r v. Beard, 77 Ind. App. 478, 134 N. E. 203 (1932). But
the birth of a child acknowledged under §6-2309, id. does not re-
voke a will under §7-303, id. Eckart v. Eckart, 95 Ind. App. 148,
163 N. E. 288 (1929).
75An adopted child is "legitimate" within §6-2309, id. Cooley v.
Powers, 63 Ind. App. 57, 113 N. E. 382 (1916).
7 6 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §6-2309. Inheritance by an illigitimate
from the father is possible in 4 other states. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW (1936) 191. Note also a fourth requirement - that
the paternity of the alleged acknowledging father be established.
Campbell v. Carroll, 71 Ind. App. 587, 124 N. E. 407 (1919);
Horner v. Boomershine, 88 Ind. App. 57, 161 N. E. 641 (1928).
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This statute does not change the legal status and does not confer
legitimacy. It is a statute of descent and confers on the illegitimate
the right of inheritance. 77 Acknowledgement prior to the date when
the statute became effective is sufficient.78 "The acknowledgement
must be definite and certain, and must be one in which the paternity
oi the child is plainly and unequivocally acknowledged. ' 79 Acknowl-
edgement is used in the common or ordinary meaning, and is a fact
to be determined by the evidence in each particular case.80 The
burden is on the illegitimate to prove acknowledgement. 81 Evidence
of denial of paternity by the putative father is admissible to deter-
mine whether an acknowledgement was ever made and intended, but
is not admissible to defeat an acknowledgement once made.82 An
illegitimate child is not entitled, under this statute to inherit from
his paternal grandparent, where the father dies before the grand-
parent.8 3
The third statute provides for the legitimation of an illegitimate
child.84 The requirements for legitimation are (1) that a man shall
7 Wilson v. Bass, 70 Ind. App. 116, 118 N. E. 379 (1918); Selby v.
Brenton, 75 Ind. App. 248, 130 N. E. 448 (1921). Note that
under the Social Security Act, a child who is treated as such for
the purpose of determining the devolution of intestate personal
property, has the status of a child. 53 STAT. 1378, 42 U. S. C. A.
§409(m) (Supp. 1940); Soc. Sec. Bd. Reg. 3, §403.829(b). See
McDermott, J., dissenting in Pfiefer v. Wright, 41 F. (2d) 464(1930), to the effect that if the law confers upon an illegitimate
the rights of legitimacy, it can properly be said to have the
"status" of a legitimate. Note 73 A. L. R. 941 (1931).78 Daggy v. Wells, 38 Ind. App. 27, 76 N. E. 524 (1906); Morin v.
Holliday, 39 Ind. App. 201, 77 N. E. 861 (1906).
71 Campbell v. Carroll, 71 Ind. App. 587, 124 N. E. 407 (1919).80 Townsend v. Menely, 37 Ind. App. 127, 74 N. E. 274 (1905). It is
proper to instruct the jury as to what words, acts, etc., would
constitute acknowledgement, as that is both a question of fact and
law. Daggy v. Wells, 38 Ind. App. 27, 76 N. E. 524 (1906).81 Townsend v. Menely, 37 Ind. App. 127, 74 N. E. 274 (1905).
82 Haddon v. Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811 (1912) ; Campbell
v. Carroll, 71 Ind. App. 587, 124 N. E. 407 (1919). It is error
to admit evidence of compromise of bastardy proceedings.
83 Wilson v. Bass, 70 Ind. App. 116, 118 N. E. 379 (1918). "Child"
when used in statutes of descent, prima facie means legitimate
child. Truelove v. Truelove, 172 Ind. 441, 86 N. E. 1018, 88 N. E.
516 (1909); Jackson v. Hocke, 171 Ind. 371, 84 N. E. 830 (1908).
But see Morin v. Holliday, 39 Ind. App. 201, 77 N. E. 861 (1906),
holding that the children of a deceased illegitimate child may
inherit from his grandparents. And it was held in Selby v. Brenton,
75 Ind. App. 248, 130 N. E. 448 (1921) that §6-2309, IND. STAT.
ANN. (Burns, 1933), modified §6-2312, id., and is not controlled
by §6-2324, id.
84 1d. §6-2310. In the 51 American judisdictions the child may become
legitimate by the act of one or both parents. The prevailing
type of statute, found in 48 jurisdictions, permits the child to
become legitimate if the parents subsequently intermarry; although
19 jurisdictions, one of which is Indiana, require acknowledg-
ment by the father in addition to marriage. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW (1936) 154.
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marry the mother of an illegitimate child, and (2) acknowledge the
child as his own. This statute is not one of descent, but changes
status from that of illegitimacy to legitimacy,85 and the legitimated
child inherits as a legitimate child.8 6 The acknowledgment need not
be expressed in words, but may be inferred from conduct.8 It is
immaterial whether the man marrying the mother and acknowledging
the child is the actual father.88 Likewise the purpose in marrying
and acknowledging is immaterial.8 9 The acknowledgment may be at
or after marriage; 9o whether it may be before marriage is an open
question in this state.91 A common-law marriage is sufficient for
the purpose of this act.
9 2
The right of a parent to benefits earned by an illegitimate child
under the Social Security Act, depends on the parent's right te in-
herit from an illegitimate child. At common law no such right
existed, save in the heirs of the body.93  The only statute on the
subject in Indiana provides that the mother may, if the illegitimate
child dies intestate and without issue or descendants, inherit his
estate. 94 An early case held that the father can not inherit from
the illegitimate child.95 In this case the issue of a marriage of the
s5 Binns v. Dagey, 147 Ind. 536, 44 N. E. 644 (1896); Haddon v.
Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811 (1912); Tieben v.
Hapner, 62 Ind. App. 650, 111 N. E. 644, 113 N. E. 310 (1806).
But see Harvey v. Ball, 32 Ind. 98 (1869) where birth, marriage
and acknowledgment all occurred outside the state. The court
held that an act similar to §6-2310 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933),
bestowed capacity of heir without regard to status.
86Harness v. Harness, 50 Ind. App. 364, 98 N. E. 357 (1912).
"There are no degrees of legitimacy in this state."
87 Bailey v. Boyd, 59 Ind. 292 (1877); Bailey v. Harshman, 60 Ind.
273 (1877). It was stated in these cases that marrying a preg-
nant woman constitutes acknowledgment; but in both cases there
was the fact of living together many years.
88 Tieben v. Hapner, 62 Ind. App. 650, 111 N. E. 644, 113 N. E. 310
(1916); Haddon v. Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811
(1912) ; Binns v. Dagey, 147 Ind. 536, 44 N. E. 644 (1896) ; Bailey
v. Boyd, 59 Ind. 292 (1877). See also Moore v. Terry, 220 Ala.
47, 124 So. 80 (1929); Bauman v. Howard, 182 N. C. 662, 110
S. E. 98 (1921).
89 Brock v. State, 85 Ind. 397 (1882). "Having removed the bar
sinister, they cannot replace it."
90 Castor v. McDole, 80 Ind. App. 556, 148 N. E. 643 (1923). In this
case the court also said acknowledgment could be after severance
of the marriage by death or otherwise.
91 Ibid. For dictum to the effect that there is strong ground for the
contention that acknowledgment may be either before or after
marriage, see Haddon v. Crawford, 49 Ind. App. 551, 97 N. E. 811
(1912).
9.2 Castor v. McDole, 80 Ind. App. 556, 148 N. E. 643 (1923).
93 See note 88 supra.
94 IND.*STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §6-2311. Statutes in 46 jurisdictions
provide that the mother may inherit from the illegitimate child.
4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (1936) 192.
gr Ellis v. Hatfield, 20 Ind. 111 (1863) (the mother dead). A similar
result is usually reached in other states. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW (1936) 192.
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mother (called half-brothers and sisters) were held entitled to in-
herit, no grounds being given for such decision, although this statute
was in effect.
Apparently only those enumerated in the statute may inherit
from an illegitimate child.96 Under the statute the court held that
an administrator of a deceased illegitimate might bring an action
for wrongful death for the benefit of his next of kin, his mother
and three half-brothers and sisters. 97 But the right to maintain
such an action was denied a father.98
Adoption. Qualification for benefits under the Old-Age and
Survivor's Insurance Law frequently depends upon the law of adop-
tion. Either the adopted child of a wage earner or its heirs may
survive the wage earner or the adoptive parents or his heirs may
survive. Before a claim may be granted, the fact of the legality
of adoption must be established. Many factors will condition the
validity of the adoption. Certainly the least of these is the conflicts
problem involving the domicile at the time of adoption and at the
time of death. The effect of adoption coupled with wills, deeds, and
contracts to adopt add further complexity to the administration of
benefits under the Social Security program. 99 Obviously these many
ramifications cannot be fully explored at this time.
Formalities necessary for adoption in Indiana, as in all other
states, are entirely statutory' 09 for the right of adoption did not
exist in common law.' 0' The proceedings of a court of competent
jurisdiction, in the adoption of a child, cannot be collaterally at-
tacked. 02 And where the proceedings are recognized as valid for
a series of years, defects in the proceedings cannot be taken ad-
vantage of by heirs of the adopting parent. 03 However, a judg-
ment of adoption procured by fraud may be set aside on direct attack
though the judgment appears on its face regular and valid. 04
The judgment of adoption of the court fixes the legal status
both of the adoptive parent and the child. 0 5 The adopted child in-
herits from the adopting parents,10 6 but does not occupy the position
90 The mother, and if she be dead, her descendants or collateral kindred.
11 L. T. Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddel, 49 Ind. App. 40, 94 N. E. 411
(1911).
98 McDonald v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 144 Ind. 459 (1896).
99 For a general discussion of the problem, see Harrington, Rights of
Adopted Children in Illinois to Federal Old-Age Benefits (1938)
3 John Marshall L. Q. 491, 510. Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 964.
10 0 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §§3-101 et seq. See Ind. Acts 1941,
c. 146. All of the 51 American jurisdictions have statutes per-
mitting adoption. 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (1936) 279.
101 See Humphries v. Davis, 100 Lid. 274 (1884).
102 Brown v. Brown, 101 Ind. 340 (1884).
103 Jones v. Leeds, 41 Ind. App. 164, 83 N. E. 526 (1907); Hunter v.
Bradshaw, 209 Ind. 71, 198 N. E. 73 (1935).
104 Glausman v. Ledbetter, 190 Ind. 505, 130 N. E. 230 (1921).
105 Paul v. Davis, 100 Ind. 422 (1884); Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind.
1274 (1884).
1 0 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §3-103.
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of a natural child,1oT and does not inherit from the relatives of the
adopting parent. 08 When an adopted child dies intestate, unmarried
and without issue, the property received by such child by gift, devise,
or descent from such adopting father or mother descends to the
adopting parent or his heirs. 10 9 However, the right to inherit from
natural relatives remains with the adopted child;110 and it seems
that the natural relatives may inherit from the adopted child such
property as is acquired otherwise than through the adoptive parents. 1"
Thus under the Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance the adopted
child may claim benefits subject to the other qualifications of the
Act and the adoptive parents may acquire benefits when the adopted
child is a covered employee.
107 Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N. E. 123 (1925) ; Nickerson
v. Hoover, 70 Ind. App. 348, 115 N. E. 588 (1919); Davis v.
Fogle, 124 Ind. 41 (1890).
108 Casper v. Helvie, 83 Ind. App. 166, 146 N. E. 123 (1925), over-
ruling in part Bray v. Miles, 23 Ind. App. 432, 54 N. E. 446, 55
N. E. 510 (1899). Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41 (1890). There is
some confusion on this point. See Morin v. Holliday, 39 Ind.
App. 201, 77 N. E. 861 (1906); Wilson v. Bass, 70 Ind. App. 116,
118 N. E. 379 (1918).
109 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §3-103. Davis v. Krug, 95 Ind. 1
(1883), overruling Barnhizel v. Farrell, 47 Ind. 335 (1874) and
Krug v. Davis, 87 Ind. 590 (1882); Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind.
274 (1884); Rountree v. Pursell, 11 Ind. App. 522, 39 N. E. 747
(1894); Dunn v. Means, 48 Ind. App. 383, 95 N. E. 1015 (1911).
110 Ind. Acts 1941, c. 146, §7.
113 Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274 (1884). This was the rule of
the civil law, Sandars' Justinian, 105; and of the Code Napoleon.
Note (1932) 80 A. L. R. 1403.
